success of the parliamentary Social Democrat Party and the rumoured (and actual)
Communist underground agitation as a sign of Finland becoming a 'half-red' country. 3 The divisions caused by the destruction of the civil war continued to run deep both in national politics and in everyday life throughout the 1920s. Following Pertti Ahonen, we have termed the Lapua Movement a "proto-fascist" movement. 7 While it could be argued that the movement employed fascist ideas and symbolism, it was only its parliamentary successor, the Patriotic People's Movement (Isänmaallinen kansanliike), that explicitly borrowed from its Italian and German counterparts. 8 According to Vesa Vares, the fiercely nationalist-populist nature of the Lapua Movement made it unable to borrow from any foreign movements. 9 Thus the movement had few coherent objectives apart from decimating the political left, and could hardly fulfil any mouthpieces" 17 of the movement, using the lens of constructionist social problems theory, where social problems are conceptualised as outcomes of "claims-making" processes (see below). Because all constructions of social problems at least imply a solution to the problem, the Lapua Movement's construction of Communism as an explicitly religious social problem led to proposing Christian piety as a solution. Hence, we will focus on three aspects of the claims-making: (1) Communism as a religious problem, (2) Christianity as a solution to
Communist godlessness, and (3) the legitimation of Christian violence against Communists.
Secondly, we will discuss possible explanations to why Communism became primarily pitted against Christianity in the movement literature. We argue that the prominent role of antireligiosity and anti-Christianity in the constructions of Communism-a staple, although not uncontested position in Christian-Marxist relations since the Communist Manifesto
18
-was an outcome of the leading role of clergy in the movement. Further, we argue that the post-civil war identification of the church with the nation enhanced the Lapua Movement message of a Christian nation struggling against internationalist Communism.
Constructing Social Problems: Theory and Method
Looking at social problems course syllabi today reveals a long and relatively homogenous list of topics: crime, drugs, alcohol, violence, racism, and environmental problems, among others.
But what about witchcraft, for example? It was certainly considered a significant social problem from the 14 th to the 17 th centuries. 19 Today, however, the practice of witchcraft enjoys constitutional protection in many if not most countries of the world. If and when behaviour-or perceived behaviour, as in the case of witchcraft-itself seems to be insufficient to define a social problem, how do we recognise a social problem in the first place? An early formulation captures this tension well:
A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some social norm which they cherish. Every social problem thus consists of an objective condition and subjective definition. The objective condition is a verifiable situation which can be checked as to existence and magnitude (proportion) by impartial and trained observers, e.g. the state of our national defense, trends in the birth rate, unemployment, etc. The subjective definition is the awareness of certain individuals that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values. 20 While early sociological research into "deviance" focused on the objective conditions (drug use, alcoholism, prostitution, etc.) without problematizing the "problematicness" of these conditions, later studies, especially from the 1960s and 1970s onwards, emphasised the subjective side. The argument was that looking at varieties of "deviance" ignores the processes where some behaviours become labelled "deviant" in the first place. As Blumer puts it: "a social problem does not exist unless it is recognized by the society to exist". 21 Indeed, Spector and Kitsuse's classic Constructing Social Problems went as far as to say that "there is no adequate definition of social problems within sociology, and there is not and has never been a sociology of social problems". 22 Spector and Kitsuse argued that the focus of a
proper sociology of social problems should be in analyzing the processes of subjective meaning-making-or "claims-making" as they put it:
[W]e define social problems as the activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions… We use the word [putative] to emphasize that any given claim or complaint is about a condition alleged to exist, rather than about a condition that we, as sociologists are willing to verify or certify. That is, in focusing the attention to the claims-making process we set aside the question whether those claims are true or false. 23 Much ink has been spilled since Spector and Kitsuse's radically subjectivist definition on what role the world outside the claims-making process should be granted. For the purposes of this article, it will suffice to say our approach falls within a moderate constructionist frame that is referred to as "contextual constructionism" in the social problems literature. 24 This means that instead of focusing solely on the linguistic features of the claims-making discourse, we will situate the claims-making within the historical and social context of its production. Hence, for us it is important to examine not only what is being said and how, but also who is doing the saying and why. Communism in 1920s and 1930s Finland was not a figment of people's imaginations (like late modern witchcraft), or a conspiracy theory with only a strained reference to reality (like modern "moral panics" about Satanism, for example). 25 Communist action-especially the conscious attempt to increase their visibility in Finnish society in 1928-29 26 -was integral in lighting the spark that led to birth of the Lapua Movement. Also, many people on the left were critical of established religion and had been so already during the Civil War of 1918. 27 Nevertheless, the movement could have constructed Communism only as an economic, or a political problem, for example. The contextual constructionist approach allows us to ask both how and why they ended up constructing
Communism also as a religious problem.
Constructionist sociology of social problems has not made great inroads into detailed methodological discussion. Some have advocated a focus on "rhetoric", but the field has been almost completely ignorant of developments in sister constructionist endeavours, especially discourse analysis. 28 While we acknowledge this ignorance (or indifference), our approach is guided first and foremost by our questions, rather than an elaborate methodological toolkit.
Hence our close reading of the texts consists of thematising the claims about Communism into (a) representations of the problem, (b) representations of solutions, (c) legitimations of action. This is mostly done through the analysis of (lexical) semantics, especially word choice, which influences the understanding of (in this case) Communism as a particular type of problem. We will also look at the rhetorical aspects of the texts, especially in terms of metaphor.
While the three journals of the movement provide a little-studied primary source, we acknowledge the interpretive limitations of such media. We do not presume to claim that our sources unproblematically reflect the beliefs of the masses of the Lapua Movement. Most of the activities of the movement consisted of direct interventions in the form of political violence, rather than political debate. (It was only the successor of the Lapua Movement, the Patriotic People's Movement, that had to refine its discursive capabilities in parliamentary work.) Yet, the fact that the journals were directed at movement "insiders", instead of engaging in broader social debate, gives us a sense of the audience and the discourses that the audience was assumed to be receptive to. The articles in the journals themselves provide some evidence of this resonance, in the form of responses to earlier pieces that echo the original ideas. Furthermore, most of the leaders of the movement contributed to the journals, and the ways in which they constructed their anti-Communism in the journals were also repeated in mass meetings.
29

Communism as a Religious Problem
The roots of Finnish anti-Communism were "indigenous" in the sense that at the time of the eruption of the Lapua Movement, its explicit mission was to salvage the White orderinstitutionalised in the expression "home, religion and fatherland" (koti, uskonto ja isänmaa) 30 -of 1918, rather than simply mimic the international fascist movement. 31 A particular form of revivalist Lutheranism had been associated with the Finnish nationalist project since independence, both by contemporary historians and the broader public. 32 Quite soon after the consolidation of the movement religion became a prominent interpretive repertoire offered to supporters for understanding what kind of social problem Communism was. Religion was not the only aspect of the Communist "problem", but the discourse of the movement journals leaves no doubt that it was seen as a significant factor-indeed, according to Risto Alapuro, the whole Lapua Movement was characterised by a sense of a counterattack against Communists who mocked the sacred values of the religious peasantry. 33 This religious aspect was strong enough to make Ernst Nolte argue that Christian sentiment played such a dominant role in few other extremist movements. 34 Firstly, Communism was a religious problem because it was, according to the journal authors, explicitly anti-religious, and anti-Christian in particular. The articles and editorials expressed this both by statement and through metaphor. In the more matter of fact style reminiscent of broader European discourses, K.R. Kares-one of the clergymen leaders of the movement-claimed that Communist Soviet Union was the source of anti-Christianity.
Soviet propaganda, Kares claimed, was spread to Finland in the form of blasphemous
Marxists and liberals, who wanted to separate religion from education. 35 According to an unnamed author in Lapuan Päiväkäsky in 1931, Christianity was the first obstacle on the course to a Socialist utopia. Despite Socialists' statements that religion should be a private matter, the movement discourse claimed that Socialists were actively working towards weakening the status of Christianity.
36
The wording is important here: It was not just Communism in the Soviet form, but all "Marxism" that was seen as incompatible with Christianity. Following the broader pattern of splits on the European left, 37 Finnish Communists saw the Social Democrats as their "social fascist" enemies. 38 But for the Lapua Movement they were all the same. Socialism would inevitably lead to communism, and the Social Democrats were the intellectual heirs of Communism. 39 Social Democrats possessed the same anti-Christian worldview as
Communists and any claims that a Christian could be a socialist were met with mockery and disdain by the journal authors. 40 Instead, true Christians should stay vigilant in the face of increasing Communist influence-as one Aktivisti author put it-lest Christianity, the religion so dear to the Finns, be destroyed by the godless Communists. 41 A variation of the anti-Christian theme was the claim that Communism/Marxism was a religion in itself: Karl Marx had founded the socialist religion, 42 the god of which was Lenin. 43 Abandoning one's Socialist convictions meant that one had to abandon his or her old Marxist gods. 44 Thus Communism/Marxism/Socialism became a heresy rather than an example of atheism or anti-religion, and the political enemy became a spiritual enemy.
This rather fluid definition of communism as something ranging from anti-religious to a religion itself was not unique to the Lapua Movement but rather common in the Finnish right-wing of the 1920s. Similar worries over the immoralities caused by "erotic bolshevism"
and socialism being a trojan horse of communism were expressed already before the emergence of the Lapua Movement. For many Whites, communism was not an ideology but something ranging from an expression of humanity's savage instincts to a plot of the Antichrist. 45 Secondly, some of the articles in the movement journals took a more rhetorical, explicitly religious claims-making style. The editorial of the first issue of Aktivisti-written by the aforementioned K.R. Kares 46 -is an example of this. He asserted that the Soviet Union was the "throne of Satan", and anti-Communism was a prime example of legitimate "holy anger". 47 For another author (identified only by his/her initials), Communism was the "horned head of the east", and joining the Communists in the hopes of better employment prospects was likened to pledging allegiance to Satan. 48 The Soviet Union, the land of the "horned head", was named "the satanic empire of the Lord of Darkness." 49 Vihtori Herttua-one of the leading "triumvirate" of the Lapua Movement and a revivalist minister 50 -warned of the "beastly gaze of the Antichrist" that was directed towards Finland from this satanic empire. 51 No compromise was possible between proper religious patriotism and Communismbetween God and the Devil. 52 In this rhetoric, the active members of the Lapua Movement were echoing the perception of Marxism as an instrument of Satan among the broader revivalist culture of Ostrobothnia. 53 Finally, in addition to actively seeking the eradication of Christianity, Communist godlessness was constructed as leading to a broad breakdown of morals and social institutions. In an article titled "What is Communism?" Matti Jaakkola, a clergyman and an integral figure of central Finland's violent radical nationalism, 54 revealed to the reader the horrors of the Soviet Union, including a complete collapse of morality, decency and family values. This catastrophe was caused, said Jaakkola, by a lack of religion. Communists had no conscience or respect for humanity. Because God's word was not heard any more in the Soviet lands, all good personal qualities like discipline, diligence and honesty had disappeared. 55 Another author claimed that the harassment of priests and general mockery of religion in the USSR had resulted in alcoholism, violence and overall degeneration among the youth. 56 Without religion, phenomena detrimental to the nation, such as hatred between the classes and class consciousness, would flourish. 57 Thus Communism should be opposed by a wide, unanimous front of Christian decency. 58 For Jaakkola and some others, the problem of godless politics was intimately connected to antisemitism: Communism was invented by the Jews and Stalin -a Jew himself, according to the author of the article -attacked the Orthodox church and its property because "he was born with Jewish greed". 59 Nothing
represented Communism better than a Communist Jew. 60 Although antisemitism never became a mass phenomenon in Finland, 61 
Christianity as a Solution to the Problem of Communism
The discourse of the Lapua Movement's journals constructed the solution to anti-Christian Communism in two ways: by reminding the Finnish people of the intimate connection between religion and nation, and by legitimating the movement's mission with a divine mandate.
Firstly, the heritage of 1918-home, religion and fatherland-was the backbone of the Finnish nation, and had to be preserved. In the tellingly titled "The Creed of White Finland", the author stated that in order to be a proper "White Finn", one had to believe in God and the Holy Trinity. 66 A good patriotic peasant was also a God-fearing one, and fought for God and the fatherland. parents. 72 Moreover, religious education in grammar schools was considered essential, and the textbooks in all levels of education were to be infused with "the right quality and spirit". "paganising" its public life. 75 Aspects of this "paganisation" included, for example, allowing parents to opt their children out of religion classes in schools, supporting "unchristian" family values by providing welfare for divorced mothers, and portraying abortion in a positive manner. 76 Kares' language resonated with its audience: an anonymous author in the first issue
of Lapuan Päiväkäsky in 1932 dreaded the possibility of the social democrats removing Christian influences from Finland and "paganising" the nation. 77 The mission of the Lapua Movement, said Kares, was to force members of parliament to make initiatives to counter this "paganisation". 78 The same message had been voiced even before Kares: Karl Olsson, writing in Aktivisti in 1930, argued that only Christianity could offer a solid moral base for a country.
Europe without Christianity would be a wilderness akin to Asia or Africa. 79 All countries that
were not Christian, were pagan. 80 Having established the intimate connection between the Finnish nation and Christianity, constant vigilance was required to uphold the patriotic legacy.
Secondly, the Lapua Movement journals constructed a special relationship with God and the Finnish nation. God created the Finnish nation, and carried it through good times and bad times, including the Civil War in which He had given strength to the Whites to win the war. 81 He continued to direct the Finnish nation for he was "the commander of the journey of our nation." 82 One author even proposed that God had taken the Finnish nation under His special tutelage, (temporarily) abandoning the Jews as the chosen people. 83 It was fairly common for Finnish radical nationalists to promote a teleological view of history. In their opinion it was Finland's destiny to expand into territories inhabited by Finno-Ugric peoples, and beat communism and the Soviet Union. These incredible feats were possible as God was considered to be on Finland's side. 84 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the claims made in the journals accredited the Lapua Movement with carrying on this divine guidance, thus embodying the special relationship between God and the Finnish nation: God was on the side of the Lapua Movement; 85 he had blessed the Movement, who were working for the benefit of God and the fatherland, attempting to impose God's law on earth. 86 Only a fool could not realise that it was God who was behind the Lapua Movement: "If the doubters do not realise that the power in the movement comes from above, they have deaf ears and blind eyes". 87 K. R. Kares had already pronounced that Vihtori Kosola-the man most often identified as the leader of the movement-had been chosen by God to lead the Finnish nation. 88 Kosola too stated in his memoirs that he was directed by the voice of God. 89 with a rebellion if their candidate was not victorious. 98 In this case too, the movement triumphed. Ståhlberg-although certainly no Socialist-was a special target of the movement. 99 He and his wife were victims of an apparently unsanctioned kidnapping in 1930, and the movement journal Aktivisti was closed down by the authorities in 1931 after an article was deemed to urge someone to assassinate the former president. 100 As the claims-making in the movement journals makes clear, legislation and legislative work should be based on Christianity. Vihtori Herttua, for example, said he could guarantee his obedience to the Finnish law only if such a Christian base was found. 101 God was the sole and absolute legislator, and only he could set laws that went against the sense of justice of the common man. If a political party tried to do the same thing, it would inevitably fail. 102 Thus all legislation had to be drafted with "a righteous mind" to ensure true legality.
Indeed, the state had to be a servant of God, and not dispute his laws. 103 According to one
Aktivisti author, all that the Lapua Movement wanted to do was to return "the peace and order of God's law" to Finnish legislation. 104 The divine mandate constructed in the movement discourse and the justification of illegal action with a transcendent law led to what became known as the "Law of Lapua"-effectively, a legitimation of vigilante justice. This supreme law necessitated the defence of "White Finland" against the Communists even if direct action and illegal means had to be employed-it was the will of God that all Marxism be eradicated from Finland. 105 Listening to the word of God was more important than obeying the secular law. 106 Or, to put it differently, patriotic illegality was preferable to unpatriotic legality. 107 The authorities' impotence did not mean that blasphemy and mockery of freedom should go unpunished. 108 Hence, fighting for the holiest values of the nation could not be a crime. 109 It is noteworthy, however, that in contrast to some other extreme right movements, the 'purifying' or ennobling aspect of violence was not highlighted. On the contrary, the movement's leader Vihtori Kosola wrote that "everyone of us knows that when the pious peasant of Ostrobothnia, the one who has faith in the God of our fathers and who has always deeply respected the law, when a part of the nation like this sees the conscious breaking of the law as the only way out, he does it with a heavy heart." 110 Violence had no intrinsic value, but was justified in removing the social problem of Communism.
Once more, the claims-making style included both "secular" statements and justificationssecular in style, even when referring to the divine mandate of the movement-and more explicitly religious language. This religious rhetoric sometimes reached millenarian tones:
God stood with the Lapua Movement in their struggle against godless Communism, blessing their weapons. 111 Although the empire of Satan would be beaten by God in the end, 112 Lapuans had to be patient and remain devout believers while fighting against Communism.
Eventually, and inevitably, God would interfere, however: When the seven plagues of God were to appear, the empire of the Antichrist would be destroyed. The Soviet Union and other "pagan empires" would wage a war against "a league of nations", in which the Soviet Union would be crushed. 113 After the forces of evil exhausted themselves and finally turned to God, he would bring peace on earth. 
Conclusion: Christian Claims-making in a Christian Nation
The kidnappings and attacks on the workers' halls in the summer of 1930 earned the Lapua Movement both notoriety and new supporters. They were also the beginning of the movement's disintegration. The media turned against the Lapuans, which in turn pushed the movement increasingly into the political fringe. 115 By early 1931 it had renounced all political parties, claiming to be above their petty struggles-a line that the majority of the movement's earlier supporters were not ready to follow. 116 This became apparent in 1932 when the movement went into open rebellion against the state on 27-28 February, demanding the White Guard to rise up in support. However, only four to five thousand people responded, while the vast majority of the 100 000 strong White Guard sided with the state. 117 By 6 March 1932 the rebellion was at an end and The Lapua Movement was banned.
As the above analysis shows, invoking religion was central to the claims-making of the Lapua Movement. Communism was not just any social problem, but a cancer on the Christian body that was Finland. Communism was "the enemy that like a worm gnaws and sucks the roots of life of our nation and leaves stinking filth behind it. That plague germ of Communism … had to be destroyed." 118 Where Communism was successful, blasphemy flourished to the detriment of the Finnish nation. 119 It is worth pointing out that despite the hatred of Communism, some sympathy towards Communists could occasionally be found: as a nobleman Lapua sympathiser noted, Communists were tarnished by the filth of Communism, but they were still "good gifts of God." 120 In other words, hate the sin, not the sinner. Occasional moments of understanding notwithstanding, Communism was a threat to religion, thus-since Finland was a Christian country-Communism was a threat to the was above secular rule of law in its struggle.
In sociological terms, the Lapua Movement's identification with a divine mission is a
good example of what could be called, following Berger and Luckmann, legitimation on a cosmic scale. 121 This is the specific province of "religious social problems", that is, immanent social phenomena that are constructed as parts of a transcendental totality-or a "symbolic universe", as Berger and Luckmann put it. 122 The extra-parliamentary politics of the movement were "populist" in the sense that they transformed immanent politics into a cosmic struggle, by literally demonising Communism. You didn't have to be even interested in politics, you just had to be a good Christian. This was a message that resonated in 1930s
Finland. strictly Christian-or Lutheran revivalist, to be more precise. 125 Unlike in the Hungarian Arrow Cross, the movement's Christianity was not simply a front for rabid antisemitism, which, with its revisionist views of Christianity, ended up alienating Hungary's clergy. 126 Although traces of antisemitism could be found, as we have shown above, the Lapua Church. 132 Furthermore, Lutheranism distinguished Finland from Russia in a much more obvious manner than Finland's autonomy did. 133 Hence, it was not just the revivalist
Ostrobothnians that found the Lapua Movement's message attractive. In fact, the revivalist connection -perceived or actual -might have enhanced the effectiveness of the message in the eyes of the broader public. While in the 1870s the revivalists were considered to be deluded and mistaken, by the early 20th century they had become the representatives of a particularly Finnish mode of Christianity and the embodiment of the ideal of the tough, hardworking and heroic Finn. 134 The above historical developments, combined with panEuropean opposition to Soviet Communism, an increasingly deteriorating diplomatic situation, and the ever-present legacy of the Civil War, goes some way towards explaining the tacit support of some non-socialist politicians as well.
This support-both among the masses, the media, and the conservative political elites-crumbled with the increasing belligerence of the movement. As we demonstrated above, some of the Lapua thinkers were not above disregarding the rule of law when it contradicted what they saw as the higher authority, God's law, and clearly people who gathered at Mäntsälä thought that was the case as well.
Yet, explaining the violence with apocalyptic escalation would be giving the religious element too much due. Religion-indigenous revivalist Lutheranism in particular-was a symbol of the post-civil war White order, and as such resonated even among the less pious.
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When the movement dissipated, it did so like a secular social movement, not a religious one.
The masses did not turn into millenarian martyrs when confrontation with the state was imminent. Instead-and despite the fiery rhetoric of the leaders-most of them went home to their families when the President urged them to do so in a radio speech. Most of the leaders came from a revivalist/neo-Pietist Christian background, prevalent in Ostrobothnia, the birthplace of the movement. 'Revivalism' in the Finnish context refers to movements within the national Lutheran church that argued for a stricter version of Christianity. While revivalist theology no doubt played a role in their political convictions, our analysis concentrates on the claims, which presented their Christianity as universal, not as a sectarian view. The premillenarianism evident in some of the rhetoric resembles other 20 th century millenarian movements, yet as we argue later, it failed to translate into religious violence associated with movements such as Christian Identity or the Ku Klux Klan. J. Kaplan 
